Blame framing and prior knowledge influence moral judgments for people involved in the Tulsa Race Massacre among a combined Oklahoma and UK sample.

Introduction: How an event is framed impacts how people judge the morality of those involved, but prior knowledge can influence information processing about an event, which also can impact moral judgments. The current study explored how blame framing and self-reported prior knowledge of a historical act of racial violence, labeled as Riot, Massacre, or Event, impacted individual's cumulative moral judgments regarding the groups involved in the Tulsa Race Massacre (Black Tulsans, the Tulsa Police, and White Tulsans). Methods and results: This study was collected in two cohorts including undergraduates attending the University of Oklahoma and individuals living in the United Kingdom. Participants were randomly assigned to a blame framing condition, read a factual summary of what happened in Tulsa in 1921, and then responded to various moral judgment items about each group. Individuals without prior knowledge had higher average Likert ratings (more blame) toward Black Tulsans and lower average Likert ratings (less blame) toward White Tulsans and the Tulsa Police compared to participants with prior knowledge. This finding was largest when what participants read was framed as a Massacre rather than a Riot or Event. We also found participants with prior knowledge significantly differed in how they made moral judgments across target groups; those with prior knowledge had lower average Likert ratings (less blame) for Black Tulsans and higher average Likert ratings (more blame) for White Tulsans on items pertaining to causal responsibility, intentionality, and punishment compared to participants without prior knowledge. Discussion: Findings suggest that the effect of blame framing on moral judgments is dependent on prior knowledge. Implications for how people interpret both historical and new events involving harmful consequences are discussed.

Metamnemonic predictions of lineup identification.

After a crime is committed, investigators may query witnesses about whether they believe they will be to identify the perpetrator. However, we know little about how such metacognitive judgments are related to performance on a subsequent lineup identification task. The extant research has found the strength of this relationship to be small or nonexistent, which conflicts with the large body of literature indicating a moderate relationship between predictions and performance on memory tasks. In Studies 1-3, we induce variation in encoding quality by having participants watch a mock crime video with either low, medium, or high exposure quality, and then assess their future lineup performance. Calibration analysis revealed that assessments of future lineup performance were predictive of identification accuracy. This relationship was driven primarily by poor performance following low assessments. Studies 4 and 5 showed that these predictions are not based on a witness's evaluation of their encoding experience, nor on a contemporaneous assessment of memory strength. These results reinforce the argument that variation in memory quality is needed to obtain reliable relationships between predictions and performance. An unexpected finding is that witnesses who made a prediction shortly after encoding evinced superior memory compared to those who made a prediction later.

Theoretical note: Exploring Luce's (1963) low-threshold model applied to recognition memory.

Whether recognition memory is mediated by discrete or continuous processes has long been the subject of debate. Deemed "the ignored alternative" by Kellen, Erdfelder, Malmberg, Dubé, and Criss (2016), Luce's (1963) low-threshold model is a discrete model that describes data thought to be indicative of continuous mediation. Kellen et al. found that the low-threshold model describes data quantitatively as well as signal detection theory, a continuous model. We replicate that finding here across 8 experiments. More interestingly, we find that this equivalence is because of the 2 models fitting different aspects of the data-the low-threshold model better fits strongly encoded stimuli, and signal detection theory better fits weakly encoded stimuli. An alternative framework for recognition memory may be necessary-one that incorporates a control process that can induce either continuous or discrete mediation. According to this framework, meta-cognitive judgments regarding the strength of an item may induce the strategic discretization of memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Task effects determine whether recognition memory is mediated discretely or continuously.

How recognition memory is mediated has been of interest to researchers for decades. But the apparent consensus implicating continuous mediation has been challenged. McAdoo, Key, and Gronlund (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,2018. Advanced online publication) demonstrated that recognition memory can be mediated by either discrete or continuous evidence, depending on target-filler similarity. The present paper expands on this research by showing that different recognition tasks also can be mediated by different evidence. Specifically, recognition memory was mediated by continuous evidence in a ranking task, but by discrete evidence in a confidence-rating task. We posit that participants utilize a control process that induces a reliance on discrete or continuous evidence as a function of efficiency (Malmberg, 2008) to suit the demands of the task.

Stimulus effects and the mediation of recognition memory.

Two broad approaches characterize the type of evidence that mediates recognition memory: discrete state and continuous. Discrete-state models posit a thresholded memory process that provides accurate information about an item (it is detected) or, failing that, no mnemonic information about the item. Continuous models, in contrast, posit the existence of graded mnemonic information about an item. Evidence favoring 1 approach over the other has been mixed, suggesting the possibility that the mediation of recognition memory may be adaptable and influenced by other factors. We tested this possibility with 2 experiments that varied the semantic similarity of word targets and fillers. Experiment 1, which used semantically similar fillers, displayed evidence of continuous mediation (contrary to Kellen & Klauer, 2015), whereas Experiment 2, which used semantically dissimilar fillers, displayed evidence of discrete mediation. The results have implications for basic theories of recognition memory, as well as for theories of applied domains like eyewitness identification. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

The impact of fillers on lineup performance.

Filler siphoning theory posits that the presence of fillers (known innocents) in a lineup protects an innocent suspect from being chosen by siphoning choices away from that innocent suspect. This mechanism has been proposed as an explanation for why simultaneous lineups (viewing all lineup members at once) induces better performance than showups (one-person identification procedures). We implemented filler siphoning in a computational model (WITNESS, Clark, Applied Cognitive Psychology 17:629-654, 2003), and explored the impact of the number of fillers (lineup size) and filler quality on simultaneous and sequential lineups (viewing lineups members in sequence), and compared both to showups. In limited situations, we found that filler siphoning can produce a simultaneous lineup performance advantage, but one that is insufficient in magnitude to explain empirical data. However, the magnitude of the empirical simultaneous lineup advantage can be approximated once criterial variability is added to the model. But this modification works by negatively impacting showups rather than promoting more filler siphoning. In sequential lineups, fillers were found to harm performance. Filler siphoning fails to clarify the relationship between simultaneous lineups and sequential lineups or showups. By incorporating constructs like filler siphoning and criterial variability into a computational model, and trying to approximate empirical data, we can sort through explanations of eyewitness decision-making, a prerequisite for policy recommendations.

Relative judgment theory and the mediation of facial recognition: Implications for theories of eyewitness identification.

Many in the eyewitness identification community believe that sequential lineups are superior to simultaneous lineups because simultaneous lineups encourage inappropriate choosing due to promoting comparisons among choices (a relative judgment strategy), but sequential lineups reduce this propensity by inducing comparisons of lineup members directly to memory rather than to each other (an absolute judgment strategy). Different versions of the relative judgment theory have implicated both discrete-state and continuous mediation of eyewitness decisions. The theory has never been formally specified, but (Yonelinas, J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 20:1341-1354, 1994) dual-process models provide one possible specification, thereby allowing us to evaluate how eyewitness decisions are mediated. We utilized a ranking task (Kellen and Klauer, J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 40:1795-1804, 2014) and found evidence for continuous mediation when facial stimuli match from study to test (Experiment 1) and when they mismatch (Experiment 2). This evidence, which is contrary to a version of relative judgment theory that has gained a lot of traction in the legal community, compels reassessment of the role that guessing plays in eyewitness identification. Future research should continue to test formal explanations in order to advance theory, expedite the development of new procedures that can enhance the reliability of eyewitness evidence, and to facilitate the exploration of task factors and emergent strategies that might influence when recognition is continuously or discretely mediated.

Initial eyewitness confidence reliably predicts eyewitness identification accuracy.

Eyewitness memory is widely believed to be unreliable because (a) high-confidence eyewitness misidentifications played a role in over 70% of the now more than 300 DNA exonerations of wrongfully convicted men and women, (b) forensically relevant laboratory studies have often reported a weak relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy, and (c) memory is sufficiently malleable that, not infrequently, people (including eyewitnesses) can be led to remember events differently from the way the events actually happened. In light of such evidence, many researchers agree that confidence statements made by eyewitnesses in a court of law (in particular, the high confidence they often express at trial) should be discounted, if not disregarded altogether. But what about confidence statements made by eyewitnesses at the time of the initial identification (e.g., from a lineup), before there is much opportunity for memory contamination to occur? A considerable body of recent empirical work suggests that confidence may be a highly reliable indicator of accuracy at that time, which fits with longstanding theoretical models of recognition memory. Counterintuitively, an appreciation of this fact could do more to protect innocent defendants from being wrongfully convicted than any other eyewitness identification reform that has been proposed to date.

Evolution of the empirical and theoretical foundations of eyewitness identification reform.

Scientists in many disciplines have begun to raise questions about the evolution of research findings over time (Ioannidis in Epidemiology, 19, 640-648, 2008; Jennions & Møller in Proceedings of the Royal Society, Biological Sciences, 269, 43-48, 2002; Mullen, Muellerleile, & Bryan in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1450-1462, 2001; Schooler in Nature, 470, 437, 2011), since many phenomena exhibit decline effects-reductions in the magnitudes of effect sizes as empirical evidence accumulates. The present article examines empirical and theoretical evolution in eyewitness identification research. For decades, the field has held that there are identification procedures that, if implemented by law enforcement, would increase eyewitness accuracy, either by reducing false identifications, with little or no change in correct identifications, or by increasing correct identifications, with little or no change in false identifications. Despite the durability of this no-cost view, it is unambiguously contradicted by data (Clark in Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 238-259, 2012a; Clark & Godfrey in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 22-42, 2009; Clark, Moreland, & Rush, 2013; Palmer & Brewer in Law and Human Behavior, 36, 247-255, 2012), raising questions as to how the no-cost view became well-accepted and endured for so long. Our analyses suggest that (1) seminal studies produced, or were interpreted as having produced, the no-cost pattern of results; (2) a compelling theory was developed that appeared to account for the no-cost pattern; (3) empirical results changed over the years, and subsequent studies did not reliably replicate the no-cost pattern; and (4) the no-cost view survived despite the accumulation of contradictory empirical evidence. Theories of memory that were ruled out by early data now appear to be supported by data, and the theory developed to account for early data now appears to be incorrect.

Revisiting absolute and relative judgments in the WITNESS model.

The WITNESS model (Clark in Applied Cognitive Psychology 17:629-654, 2003) provides a theoretical framework with which to investigate the factors that contribute to eyewitness identification decisions. One key factor involves the contributions of absolute versus relative judgments. An absolute contribution is determined by the degree of match between an individual lineup member and memory for the perpetrator; a relative contribution involves the degree to which the best-matching lineup member is a better match to memory than the remaining lineup members. In WITNESS, the proportional contributions of relative versus absolute judgments are governed by the values of the decision weight parameters. We conducted an exploration of the WITNESS model's parameter space to determine the identifiability of these relative/absolute decision weight parameters, and compared the results to a restricted version of the model that does not vary the decision weight parameters. This exploration revealed that the decision weights in WITNESS are difficult to identify: Data often can be fit equally well by setting the decision weights to nearly any value and compensating with a criterion adjustment. Clark, Erickson, and Breneman (Law and Human Behavior 35:364-380, 2011) claimed to demonstrate a theoretical basis for the superiority of lineup decisions that are based on absolute contributions, but the relationship between the decision weights and the criterion weakens this claim. These findings necessitate reconsidering the role of the relative/absolute judgment distinction in eyewitness decision making.

Searching for the sequential line-up advantage: a distinctiveness explanation.

Gronlund ( 2005 ) proposed that one factor leading to a sequential line-up advantage could be the greater likelihood of recollecting distinctive information about a perpetrator when using a sequential line-up. Since then questions have been raised about the robustness of the sequential advantage and the possible moderating role of line-up fairness and suspect position. We manipulated these factors as well as suspect/target distinctiveness in two experiments. A sequential advantage occurred only after encoding a distinctive target, both for biased line-ups (Experiment 1) and fair line-ups (Experiment 2). Remember-Know results were consistent with the greater use of a recall-to-reject strategy in target-absent sequential line-ups. This provided support for the first process-based explanation of the sequential line-up advantage. No consistent position effects were found, but this might be due to the line-up recognition paradigm used, in which each participant viewed a line-up for each of several targets. Theory-based explorations of eyewitness identification are necessary to continue to delineate the underpinnings of the sequential line-up advantage.

Exploring the sequential lineup advantage using WITNESS.

Advocates claim that the sequential lineup is an improvement over simultaneous lineup procedures, but no formal (quantitatively specified) explanation exists for why it is better. The computational model WITNESS (Clark, Appl Cogn Psychol 17:629-654, 2003) was used to develop theoretical explanations for the sequential lineup advantage. In its current form, WITNESS produced a sequential advantage only by pairing conservative sequential choosing with liberal simultaneous choosing. However, this combination failed to approximate four extant experiments that exhibited large sequential advantages. Two of these experiments became the focus of our efforts because the data were uncontaminated by likely suspect position effects. Decision-based and memory-based modifications to WITNESS approximated the data and produced a sequential advantage. The next step is to evaluate the proposed explanations and modify public policy recommendations accordingly.

Robustness of the sequential lineup advantage.

A growing movement in the United States and around the world involves promoting the advantages of conducting an eyewitness lineup in a sequential manner. We conducted a large study (N = 2,529) that included 24 comparisons of sequential versus simultaneous lineups. A liberal statistical criterion revealed only 2 significant sequential lineup advantages and 3 significant simultaneous advantages. Both sequential advantages occurred when the good photograph of the guilty suspect or either innocent suspect was in the fifth position in the sequential lineup; all 3 simultaneous advantages occurred when the poorer quality photograph of the guilty suspect or either innocent suspect was in the second position. Adjusting the statistical criterion to control for the multiple tests (.05/24) revealed no significant sequential advantages. Moreover, despite finding more conservative overall choosing for the sequential lineup, no support was found for the proposal that a sequential advantage was due to that conservative criterion shift. Unless lineups with particular characteristics predominate in the real world, there appears to be no strong preference for conducting lineups in either a sequential or a simultaneous manner. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Individuals lower in working memory capacity are particularly vulnerable to anxiety's disruptive effect on performance.

Anxiety has a disruptive effect on performance in a number of domains. The purpose of this study was to determine whether individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity are related to an individual's susceptibility to anxiety's detrimental effect on performance. Fifty undergraduate students (28 females) were administered the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) to measure trait anxiety and the automated operation span task to measure WM capacity (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). Then, they performed a highly demanding dual-task that consisted of a primary short-term memory task and a secondary tone-discrimination task that served as a measure of spare capacity. Anxiety and WM capacity interacted to affect performance on the auditory task so that those low in WM capacity were particularly vulnerable to anxiety's disruptive effect, whereas those high in WM capacity were buffered against anxiety's effect. These findings suggest that WM capacity may be an important factor in determining which individuals underperform on anxiety-provoking tests such as scholastic achievement tests.

Lineup composition, suspect position, and the sequential lineup advantage.

N. M. Steblay, J. Dysart, S. Fulero, and R. C. L. Lindsay (2001) argued that sequential lineups reduce the likelihood of mistaken eyewitness identification. Experiment 1 replicated the design of R. C. L. Lindsay and G. L. Wells (1985), the first study to show the sequential lineup advantage. However, the innocent suspect was chosen at a lower rate in the simultaneous lineup, and no sequential lineup advantage was found. This led the authors to hypothesize that protection from a sequential lineup might emerge only when an innocent suspect stands out from the other lineup members. In Experiment 2, participants viewed a simultaneous or sequential lineup with either the guilty suspect or 1 of 3 innocent suspects. Lineup fairness was varied to influence the degree to which a suspect stood out. A sequential lineup advantage was found only for the unfair lineups. Additional analyses of suspect position in the sequential lineups showed an increase in the diagnosticity of suspect identifications as the suspect was placed later in the sequential lineup. These results suggest that the sequential lineup advantage is dependent on lineup composition and suspect position.

Top-down guidance in visual search for facial expressions.

Using a visual search paradigm, we investigated how a top-down goal modified attentional bias for threatening facial expressions. In two experiments, participants searched for a facial expression either based on stimulus characteristics or a top-down goal. In Experiment 1 participants searched for a discrepant facial expression in a homogenous crowd of faces. Consistent with previous research, we obtained a shallower response time (RT) slope when the target face was angry than when it was happy. In Experiment 2, participants searched for a specific type of facial expression (allowing a top-down goal). When the display included a target, we found a shallower RT slope for the angry than for the happy face search. However, when an angry or happy face was present in the display in opposition to the task goal, we obtained equivalent RT slopes, suggesting that the mere presence of an angry face in opposition to the task goal did not support the well-known angry face superiority effect. Furthermore, RT distribution analyses supported the special status of an angry face only when it was combined with the top-down goal. On the basis of these results, we suggest that a threatening facial expression may guide attention as a high-priority stimulus in the absence of a specific goal; however, in the presence of a specific goal, the efficiency of facial expression search is dependent on the combined influence of a top-down goal and the stimulus characteristics.

Aging and visual search: automatic and controlled attentional bias to threat faces.

Using a visual search paradigm, we investigated how age affected attentional bias to emotional facial expressions. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants searched for a discrepant facial expression in a matrix of otherwise homogeneous faces. Both younger and older adults showed a more effective search when the discrepant face was angry rather than happy or neutral. However, when the angry faces served as non-target distractors, younger adults' search was less effective than happy or neutral distractor conditions. In contrast, older adults showed a more efficient search with angry distractors than happy or neutral distractors, indicating that older adults were better able to inhibit angry facial expressions. In Experiment 3, we found that even a top-down search goal could not override the angry face superiority effect in guiding attention. In addition, RT distribution analyses supported that both younger and older adults performed the top-down angry face search qualitatively differently from the top-down happy face search. The current research indicates that threat face processing involves automatic attentional shift and a controlled attentional process. The current results suggest that age only influenced the controlled attentional process.

Sequential lineups: shift in criterion or decision strategy?

R. C. L. Lindsay and G. L. Wells (1985) argued that a sequential lineup enhanced discriminability because it elicited use of an absolute decision strategy. E. B. Ebbesen and H. D. Flowe (2002) argued that a sequential lineup led witnesses to adopt a more conservative response criterion, thereby affecting bias, not discriminability. Height was encoded as absolute (e.g., 6 ft [1.83 m] tall) or relative (e.g., taller than). If a sequential lineup elicited an absolute decision strategy, the principle of transfer-appropriate processing predicted that performance should be best when height was encoded absolutely. Conversely, if a simultaneous lineup elicited a relative decision strategy, performance should be best when height was encoded relatively. The predicted interaction was observed, providing direct evidence for the decision strategies explanation of what happens when witnesses view a sequential lineup.

A tandem random walk model of the SAT paradigm: response times and accumulation of evidence.

The speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) paradigm forces participants to trade response speed for information accuracy by presenting them with a response signal at variable times after the onset of processing to which they must give an immediate response (within 300 ms). The processes that underlie the paradigm, especially those affecting response times, are not completely understood. Also, the extent to which the paradigm might affect the evidence accumulation process is still unclear. By testing several different sets of assumptions, we present a random walk model for the SAT paradigm that qualitatively explains both accuracy and response time data. The model uses a tandem random walk, with two possible continuations in a second phase which begins after the response signal. If a boundary is not reached during phase one, the walk transfers the current sum (relative to the size of the boundaries) from phase one to phase two in the form of bias, with drift rate equal to zero. If, however, a boundary is reached in phase one, the second phase starts from zero (no bias) with a strong drift rate towards the previously reached boundary. The model also incorporates a psychological refractory period: a delay in the onset of a second task when two tasks are presented in close succession. The model is consistent with the idea that information about the evidence accumulation rate is not contaminated by the paradigm.